The Concept of National Character and the Problem of Humanity (in Kazimierz Dąbrowski’s Perspective)

INTRODUCTION

 

A text by a psychiatrist, Kazimierz Dąbrowski (1902–1980), O narodowym charakterze Polaków, (ca. 1957–1962) (On Polish National Character) has its origins in the Romantic theory of history, nation and character. As a good context for his arguments can be regarded the remarks of Hegel, the great German idealist who gave a new meaning to such categories as Zeitgeist and Weltgeist. They were and still are used, either overtly or covertly, by the philosophy of history of the 19th and 20th century.

 

Particular exemplifications of the German Romantic theory of character can be found in the thought of Polish mystics, poets and writers as well as historians, psychologists and cultural anthropologists. This German concept was transformed in Poland by a Judaic and Christian messianic project, which forms the basis for the description of “Polish national character”. In the 20th century it is complemented by theories of temperament, founded on the data from the field of normal and pathological psychophysiology.

 

In European culture the concept of nation emerges relatively late. In Europe the most productive in respect of the emergence of nations is the 17th century (Spain, France), later on they are joined by Italy and Germany. A century earlier a nation had been formed in England. The process of nationalization of tribes, families, peoples, districts, cities, principalities lasted immensely long. An Oxford academic, Arnold J. Toynbee (1889–1975), in his twelve-volume work “A Study of History” (1934–1961) defined the nation as a combination of tribalism and democracy.

 

Hubertus Duijker and Nico Frijda (1960), Dutch scholars, distinguished six types of definitions of national character, corresponding to the research methods adopted.¹

 

1. National character: a set of psychological traits that is characteristic for the people belonging to a nation and that sets them apart from other nations.

2. National character: the most common type of behavior of the adult members of a society.

3. National character: a system of conducts, values and convictions shared by the majority of a society.

4. National character: a basic (permanent and continuous) structure of personality of people belonging to the same culture, based on the processes of standardization, socialization and education.

5. National character: learned and inherited cultural behavior and systems of norms, values and aims that are used by institutions of culture and are present in its products.

6. National character: the mentality that is present (explicitly or implicitly) in literature, art and philosophy which functions as national “spirit”. One of the first philosophers who took up the question of nation after World War Two was José Ortega y Gasset. The lectures on nation that he gave in Berlin after World War Two entitled “De Europa meditation quaedam” were published in 1960 under the title “Meditación de Europa” and in Poland as “Rozmyślania o Europie” (2006). He analyzed the relations between the concept of nation and Europeanism in the moment when many nations in Europe had been destroyed, seized, altered, subdued and divided. Yet he didn’t find new categories to describe the post-war reality of Germany, leaving the mythological (“German”) and therapeutical understanding of the concept of nation.

 

The propagators of the old theory of nation identified, e.g., the chosen nation, the nation of mankind, the person-nation, the autonomous nation, the cultural nation, the federal nation, the European nation, the self governed nation, the legal nation, the subdued nation, the free nation, the mythical nation, the nation without land, the united nation, the dispersed nation, etc. The aim of these concepts was to determine the differences and boundaries between awareness and unawareness of a community.

 

For a long time either historical psychology (cf. Robert Mandrou [1921– 1984]) or psychological history has been studying and describing various areas of human life, e.g.: dance, theatre, magic, customs, superstitions, different farming methods, folk songs or suicides, etc. The present paper presents the problems of the psychology of national character as a fragment of the psychology of history and the psychology of nation. As long as the object and subject of history are nations (cf. Johann. G. Herder [1744–1803]) and Leopold von Ranke [1795–1886]) the study of their character is substantiated.²

 

Historical psychology, the psychology of age, the psychology of nation as well as the psychology of empire are not concerned with studying principles, but the image and purpose of the psychological phenomena occurring at a specific time and in a specific space, where the aims of the whole structure harmonize or disharmonize with the aims of groups and individuals.

 

In Poland the diverse problems of the philosophy and theology of history in the post-war period at present are discussed, in terms of theology, by the Rev. Czesław Bartnik (2001) and the Rev. Jerzy Lewandowski (1982). The issues of humanity in context of the open (phenomenological, Judaic-Christian and Buddhist) ethics, in her own understanding, are presented by Halina RomanowskaŁakomy (2001).

 

HUMAN NATURE, DIGNITY, HUMANITY

 

The issues of nation are frequently examined in relation to human nature, dignity and humanity. According to Max Scheler (1874-1928), man is a “transition” from the “country of God” to the “country of nature”. The readiness to go beyond the self, the willingness to become a “superman” or “God” is fundamental to the primitive understanding of humanity. He thinks that the realization of every “I” and “we” is governed, above all, by the biological and ecological reproduction (A. Adler), sublimation (S. Freud) and sacralization (St. Augustine of Hippo, C. G. Jung).

 

Originally, in the history of philosophical (ethical, legal, psychological) thought, the concept of humanity was identified with holiness (Greek hosiotes), which, even in Plato’s writings, is still considered as a constant characteristic of personality. And although it was removed from the Aristotle’s theory, it persisted and lingers as a basic category of the sacred Christian principle of humanity. After the centuries of supremacy, the principle of humanity was complemented by the humanistic principle, which broadened the discourse concerning man beyond the current collective and individual categories, beyond the differences and boundaries of his activity and thought. From the 18th century on, it radically manifested itself in the anthropological thought as the “principle of reason”.

 

Historically, the problem appears as the problem of Ideal, Good, Unity, Community, Entirety, Holiness, Dignity, etc. It is to be the response to the problem of Concretum, Evil, Difference, Individuality, Singularity, Secularism, Property, etc. The philosophical problem of humanity emerged in philosophy in the European Renaissance.

 

As it was aptly noted by Nicolase Crypfs (also called Nicholas of Kues [1401–1464]), there are concepts that combine contents which form the “union of opposites” (coincidentia oppositorum). In his opinion, for example, the “human nature”, which exists only in individuals, also is a constituent of the divinehuman nature in Christ (the microcosm). The Poles cultivate such kind of divine- human humanity, which merges “the highest” with “the lowest” of what exists in man and in the human world. They don’t notice any contradiction in it. Consequently, the principle regulates their conscious and unconscious perception of the whole social reality.³
The christological principle of humanity, as a sacred principle, was not everywhere replaced neither by the secular principle of “humanitas” nor by the Enlightenment principle of “reason”. Since more than a thousand years ago till this day, in the opinion of the majority of the Poles of Catholic Faith, holiness (as the religious principle of humanity in the Christian version) is the necessary and sufficient principle to say that in our culture, politics and life, the principle of humanity is present.

 

The Nicolas of Kues’s concept, according to which due to the presence of a certain number of basic moral laws, which are recognized intuitively by all nations, the laws being approximate to the Decalogue and the two commandments of love, it is possible to bring together all the people under one religion, has not been adopted. The Poles still show their reluctance or even objection to such an idea.

 

THE ROMANTIC PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF THE CONCEPT OF CHARACTER

 

As stated by Hegel (cf. Lectures on Aesthetics, Heidelberg 1818 and Berlin 1820), “true character implies essentially worthy aims, and, on the other hand a firm grip of such aims, so that the whole being of its individuality would be lost if the aims had to be given up and abandoned. This fixity and substantiality constitutes the keynote of character” (Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, vol.1, p. 68).

 

The powers of individual action are family, country, state, church, fame, friendship, honor, love etc. “In the degree of their validity these powers are different, but all are inherently rational. At the same time these are the powers over the human heart, which man, because he is man, has to recognize; he has to accept their power and give them actualization.” (Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, vol. 1, p. 220) They are affirmative and negative forces, powers, which occupy the interior of character. They impulse us to action, they are the stimulus which produces reaction, they control all the positive and negative behaviors of man.

 

The powers of universal action are (1) gods, (2) pathos and (3) character. “True, the eternal dominant forces are immanent in man’s self; they make up the substantial side of his character” (Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, vol.1, p. 225). Gods are cosmic, mystical and metaphysical powers, known from mythology, revelations and religions. Pathos is holy and rational feelings, whose content is present in human self. They fill his soul, which is accessible to every kind of pathos. In individuality character is pathos and totality is divinity. “This totality is man in his concrete spirituality and its subjectivity, is the human total individuality as character. The gods become human ‘pathos’, and ‘pathos’ in concrete activity is the human character” (Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, vol. 1, p. 236).

 

Hegel distinguishes (1) character in itself, thus total individuality (fullness); (2) defined character, thus the totality present in individuality; (3) character consistent in itself, thus united with determinateness, as with itself, in its subjective being for itself, in order to realize itself. This fullness of each character must appear concentrated in one subject. It cannot be disjointed, blurred, diffused, freakish and variably excitable as, for example, children, who take up everything and make something of it for a moment, but are without constant character.

 

Character enters the most varied elements of the human soul, is in them, and does not diffuse itself in the whole diversity. Character “must not stand still in them but rather, in this totality of interests, aims, qualities, traits of character, preserve the subjectivity which is mustered and held together in itself” (Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, vol.1, p. 236). Character has an aesthetic, ethic and religious dimension. All of them are analyzed, with different emphases, in different projects of creation of so-called “national characters”.

 

THE POSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE KAZIMIERZ DĄBROWSKI’S TEXT ON POLISH NATIONAL CHARACTER

 

Today, on the Polish academic market there is an extensive study by Edmund Lewandowski entitled Charakter narodowy Polaków i innych [The National Character of the Poles and Others] (2nd ed., 2008, p. 372). The author draws numerous comparisons among the characters of Poles, Germans, Russians, Jews and Frenchmen. His study is supported by many references to the opinions of the foremost writers expressing their views on that topic (over 700 names in the index). Though, for example, the name of Wincenty Lutosławski is not mentioned.

 

The Dąbrowski’s text is included in the Lewandowski’s study, in the group of psychological-medical analyses, definitions and remarks (e.g.: E. Brzezicki, H. Drescher, Z. Freud, E. Fromm, C.G. Jung, A. Kamiński, A. Kępiński, E. Kretschmer, A. Munthe, Z. Nęcki, J. Ochorowicz, K. Pospiszyl, H. Radlińska, B. Suchodolski, A. Szymusik, W. Witwicki). The structure of the Dąbrowski’s text The National Character of the Poles and Others consists of three parts: (1) negative traits, (2) positive traits, (3) the determinants of character.

 

Among the traits of character listed by the author, there can be found all of those mentioned in Aristotle’s Ethics (in the group of surfeit, deficiency and virtues) but in a slightly different configuration. Curiously enough, one will not find among these traits of Polish national character, e.g., shame, which hadn’t been identified by the author.

 

In my study, I have chosen two chapters from the Dąbrowski’s text. The fragments illustrate the method and the range of analysis of Polish national character. The first from the “negative” group, “Excessive syntonicity, moodiness, ‘a flash in the pan’, proneness to the ‘foci of obstinacy’ ” [pp. 106–108]) and the last from the “positive” group, “Talents” (Dąbrowski, 1992, pp. 127–128). In the beginning of the analysis of the first chapter, a remark suggests itself that the whole text has an affinity (apart form the question of the range and proportions of the research) with the Max Scheler’s approach presented in the book Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (1923). Instead of the concept of character Scheler uses the concept of “expression” (Ausdruck), “nation” (Nation, Volk), mankind (Menschheit) as a historical and collective individual, as a mass, etc. The full structure of the K. Dąbrowski’s text, according to its headings⁴, is presented below:

 

(A) On Selected Negative Traits of Polish Character: (1) Excessive Syntonicity, “A Flash in the Pan”, Proneness to the “Foci of Obstinacy” (pp. 106– 108); (2) Recklessness and Superficiality (pp. 108–109); (3) Personalism (pp. 109–110); (4) Cliquishness (p.111); (5) Self-interest and Factiousness (pp. 111– 112); (6) The Tolerance of Impunity; (7) Weak and One-sided Organisational Abilities; (8) The Lack of Continuity of Intellectual Effort (pp. 116–117); (9) The Cult of Incompetence (pp. 117–119); (10) The Lack of Regard for Valuable People (pp. 119–120), Egocentricity (pp. 120–121), The Lack of Adequate Selfesteem and Emphasizing the Importance of Exterior Appearances (pp. 121– 122).

 

(B) Positive Traits of Polish Character: (1) The Proclivity to Idealize, Romanticism, Misticism (pp. 122–123); (2) Courage and Heroism (pp. 123–124); (3) Mildness, Humanitarianism, Magnanimity, the Lack of Cruelty (pp. 124– 125); (4) Truthfulness, the “Yes” for “Yes”, “No” for “No” Attitude, Loyalty and Fulfilling Commitments (pp. 123–126); (5) Hospitality (p. 126); (6) Obstinacy and Nervousness (pp. 126–127); (7) The Sense of Autonomy and Freedom, Individualism (p. 127)⁵; (8) Talents (pp. 127–128). (C) The Determinants of the basic Polish character traits.

 

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE KAZIMIERZ DABROWSKI’S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL CHARACTER

 

The postulation to expand the theory of character by taking into account the physiological factors, which had been previously treated separately, was put forward by F. Jordan (1890). Similarly, A. F. Shand (1914) stressed the necessity of linking the concept of character with the somatic factors. Ernst Kretschmer (1926), by contrast, described character as dependent on physical constitution. In the analyzed text Kazimierz Dąbrowski does not differentiate temperament from character, indicating its psychophysiological and psychoneurological bases. For the sake of clarity of my argument I decided to introduce this distinction. I intend to emphasize that certain propositions of psychophysiology, sociology and psychology of character can be accepted as propositions possible to correlate or positively correlative. Nevertheless, the theses are not totally and very probable.

 

Yet in antiquity (e.g. according to Hippocrates) the concept of temperament was implanted in the theory of character. This type of relation, on the basis of “contiguity” of concepts of psychology and behaviorism is applied in the majority of theories today. In science the method of matching a temperament with a character, certain features with a certain model, is a basis for formulating hypotheses. Nonetheless the result of a research based on the method cannot be regarded as an empirical or scientific fact, but as a model of classification of features of a similar kind.

 

FIVE FACTOR REACTIVE MODEL OF “POLISH TEMPERAMENT”

 

Kazimierz Dąbrowski describes the Polish national character taking into consideration the propositions concerning temperament (biological bases of behavior). The Polish national character in his theory consists of five dimensions of character with multidimensional index of character traits referring to individual and social behaviors. It is a metaphorical concept. After all, we do not know how the psychological turns into the biological and vice versa, how the biological turns into the psychological.

 

Dąbrowski’s descriptions are a combination of variational and substantive (essential and existential) approach. The author in his theory assumes that man perceives reality through five basic faculties: the sensory, motor, imaginative, emotional and intellectual. Each of these faculties (in psychophysiology also called channels) can be the centre of configuration of all the other types of behavior and character.

 

Kazimierz Dąbrowski identifies the psychoneurological centers of a specific organism with the concept of excitability (the psychical, or psychophysical hyperexcitability, or increased excitability) and assumes that they structuralize the cognition and behavior of man.

 

In conformity with such a model he diagnoses the psychophysical bases of Polish character, which are as follows:
— sensory excitability (considerable),
— psychomotor excitability (considerable),
— imaginative excitability (considerable),
— affective excitability (utmost),
— intellectual excitability (low) (not mentioned in the K. Dąbrowski’s analysis).

 

THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALGORITHM OF POLISH THINKING

 

In order to diagnose the type of Polish thinking, Kazimierz Dąbrowski employs the concept of agglutinative reasoning described by a neurologist of Russian origin, Professor at the University of Zurich, Constantin von Monakow (1853–1930).
The agglutinative model of thinking means: criticality (low), convincedness (high), arguments (insufficient), argumentation (insufficient).

 

The Polish emotional bases of thinking are dynamic, which means: impatience (high), quick temper (constant), haste (constant), motor activity (considerable), restraining (weak).
The Polish sensory bases are weak, which means that the perceptions are limited and superficial.

 

The Polish imaginative bases are one-sided, which means that the imagination is “individual” (making up things).

 

The Polish volitional bases are deficient, which means: will (partial), strongly identified with anxiety; decisions made too fast or too late; a wish to “get rid of decisions”.

 

The Polish behavioral bases of thinking are closely linked, which means: “thinking while acting”; “thinking after acting”; a transition from the attitude “it seems to me” to the attitude “it is my conviction that”, or “I know”.

 

THE REACTIVE MODEL OF POLISH BEHAVIOR

 

1. “Stimuli, which should each time provoke the analysis of a new situation, activate short schematic associations, are interpreted in the simplest and previously channeled ways. They trigger off a sort of social ‘contraction’, a psychical tetanus-like state, in which the ‘no’ attitude is not supported with any analytical argumentation, but is based on the affective memory and schematic, very general associations of stimuli and responses” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 108).

 

2. “It is a sort of knee-jerk response, in which all the complex reactions, and thus abstract reasoning as well, are inhibited, suppressed” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 108).

 

3. “This state of inhibition and the primitivism of reactions can pass, in certain circumstances, into the phase of the outburst of disinhibition, in which discursive reasoning is scarcely involved” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 108).
4. “Both attitudes, the excitability as well as the one involving inhibitions, proneness to influences, moodiness and seclusion from the influences of moods are manifestations of a polarized personality combining the features of cyclothymia with a schizothymic component” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 108).

 

5. The first attitude is more typical for urban population; the second characterizes the rural one (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 108).

 

SELECTED EMOTIONAL DETERMINANTS AND THEIR MANIFESTATIONS IN BEHAVIOR

 

It is known that K. Dąbrowski was a student of Edouard Claparede, whose assistant lecturer was Jean Piaget (I saw an entry in the Dąbrowski’s student record book from a Claparede’s course made by Piaget). Piaget developed the theory of mind; Claparede wanted Dąbrowski to work on the theory of emotions. And so it happened. Dąbrowski developed the P. Bovet’s postulations and integrated them with neoevolutionism (among others with the J. Mazurkiewicz’s theory). He was convinced that emotions are determinants of the development of personality and community. He developed this theory till the end of his life. How emotionality is integrated with behavior in Polish character is presented below.
IMPULSIVE MOODINESS (Sensitivity and Proneness to Resentment)

 

Mood is an “emotional state”, which accompanies individual and collective perceptions, thinking and acting during a longer period of time. It is an “emotional shade” of every psychical process. It can be positive (e.g. pleasure and satisfaction), or negative (e.g. distress and dissatisfaction).

 

The amplitude of the shifts of mood doesn’t exceed the boundaries of shallow depression (subdepression) and shallow excitement (hypomania, or automania), or megalomania and mythomania combined with deficient actual actions. Greater depression is hypothymia. The elevation of mood is hyperthymia. Both of these types of mood are components of manic (euphoric) state.

 

When extensive and recurring shifts of mood (the amplitude) are not dependent on the external factors are a manifestation of the temperament and belong to the cyclothymic character. K. Dąbrowski registers such excessive moodiness in Poles.

 

EMOTIONAL SYNTONY IN BEHAVIOR (Adhesiveness and Overpoliteness)

 

The term of syntony was introduced into science by a Swiss psychiatrist, Eugen Bleuler, in order to denote the disposition of character to a harmonic and consonant attitude toward others. It means that a person is good-natured and easily makes contacts with others. Nevertheless the national character trait of the Poles is “excessive syntony”, behaviors that are too “friendly”, too “sociable”, a tendency to excessive “sticking” to others.

 

Ernst Kretschmer related the concept of syntony to the pyknic body build and cyclothymia, which is characterized by higher incidence of manicdepressive psychoses.

 

The syntonic and cyclical, collective and individual states of ecstasy and euphoria interlaced with the states of melancholy are quite frequently observed among Poles in collective and individual behavior. The cyclothymic character (or temperament) is distinguished by the excess of extraversion (outward orientation) and introversion (inward orientation).

 

EMOTIONAL COMPENSATION IN THINKING

 

The psychological definition of national character involves the procedures (processes) of sublimation and desublimation, compensation and decompensation, sacralization and desacraliztion.

 

These phenomena are described in accordance with the assumptions of behaviorism and psychoanalysis, depth psychology and personalism, due to the multilevel and multi-surface description of personality development.

 

According to Dąbrowski, the major formative factor is “emotions”, he demonstrates in his conception their fundamental significance for personal development.

 

1. It is known from the experiments in the field of the physiology of nervous system and sociology that the control of our behavior is, almost as a rule, emotion- based.
2. This control can be exercised by the unrestrained primitive emotionality, not connected neither with the functions of psychological and logical analysis nor with the deepened function of synthesis. It can also be exercised by linked and deepened emotionality elaborated in its higher form, i.e. emotionality of a higher level.

 

The premise of the controlling role of emotions in the personality development leads Dąbrowski to the conviction that emotional people are distinguished, better, more humanized, more sensitive, almost ideal, although they are in crises or provoke them (cf. “Odezwa do Psychoneurotyków” [Appeal to Psychoneurotics], or “Przesłanie do Nadwrażliwych” [Message to the Oversensitive]). The association of this premise with the description of Polish national character imparts to it, in spite of all its defects, an elite, superior status ⁶.

 

EMOTIONAL CHANGEABILITY (Overcharge and Irradiation)

 

Dąbrowski aptly registers the emotional surpluses and deficits of Polish national character.

 

1. “The most frequently we are guided by the primitive feelings or a liability occurs, a changeability, a variation, on the one hand, of the high feelings, on the other, the primitive ones” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

2. “The primitive affectivity of the quickness of decisions and its realization contribute to the easiness of irradiation of one emotional state to others, including the intellectual activities” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

3. “The rapidly arising stimuli, the easiness of irradiation, the overcharge and disarray of the repositories of ‘emotional energy’ provoke their discharge in the ways that are frequently improper, not well thought out, often secondary and irrelevant” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

4. “This property (…) is related to the significant general sensitivity, and specially to the sensory, imaginative and emotional sensitivity” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

 

EMOTIONAL EXPLOSIVENESS (Inflammability and Liability)

 

The negative description of the function of the negative elements of Polish national character doesn’t lead Dąbrowski to its rejection and creation of projects of its improvement.

 

The author is fascinated by this description. As a psychiatrist he discerns in the deficits of character, above all, compensational reactions and due to the fact he ethically (therapeutically) justifies them.

 

1. “Therefore, there occurs a proclivity to submission to multidirectional stimuli, changeability and explosiveness in acting” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

2. “It is precisely the quite typical for Poles ‘a flash in the pan’ approach” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

 

EMOTIONAL DISTRUST (Mistrust and Obstinacy)

 

1. Very characteristic for the Polish character is what constitutes the polar opposite of their temperament, hence, against the explosiveness—obstinacy, mistrust, and distrust (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

2. “Too strong and quickly growing tensions were not and are not properly used, they often express a play of coincidences” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

 

EMOTIONAL ANTINOMIES IN THINKING (The Loop of Denials and Confirmations)
Kazimierz Dąbrowski indicates that the phenomena of emotional irradiation coexist in Poles with production of reactions and attitudes of polarity inverse to the direction of influence. Thinking is contradicted, which changes “no” into “yes” and “no” into denying “yes”. Despite the fact that a little further he praises Poles for taking “yes” for “yes” and “no” for “no”.

 

The exemplar behavior based on the model of agglutinative reasoning is represented by a recent Polish president, who ritualized it in the saying “I am for and even against”. It can be assumed that even today the tendency to double negation is a strong component of the Polish agglutinative thinking.

 

THE RURAL SYNDROME OF INDIVIDUAL AND NATIONAL CHARACTER

 

The rural and urban emotional subsystems decide on the emotional form of national character. In a city it is functional, mainly due to industrialization, communication, and democracy (enterprise, mobility, exchange, rapidity, alternative etc.).

 

In rural areas the situation looks different. The level of industrialization is limited; the system of communication is based on a hierarchical (feudal) model of information transmission, from ear to ear. The system of rural communication in Poland considerably hinders the development of functional social communication and imparts to it a pseudo-confidential character, which efficiently sustains the traditional characteristic of “national cohesion”, based on the predominant emotional, moral and religious premises (instead of, e.g. the technological, scientific, or democratic ones).

 

The set of traits of national character, which according to Dąbrowski includes the rural syndrome, manifests itself as a constant rigid tendency to distrust, resistance and obstinacy. The author justifies it with these words: “The experiences, most often of distressing character, deepened by the previously mentioned typological features, provoked the attitude of distrust and resistance to the positive and negative changes, to fair and unfair argumentation, hence to all ‘novelties’ and cultural, social, economical reforms” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

 

The rural syndrome of Polish national character is of noble and peasant provenance. It was shaped by forced psychological attachment to the place of birth, dwelling and work. The centuries of ritualization of behaviors related to the settled way of life, rigidity of customs, traditions and profession resulted in low capacity of characterological changes, low mobility of families and little professional mobility. The Polish rural syndrome is marked by a strong tendency to pseudo-hierarchization, which pathologizes or hampers democratic social relations.⁷

 

The city, a product of law, turns its citizens into politeis and also turns politeis into gods. It confers them a legal status and makes them the highest members of the political body. For this reason the law of the city has two spheres, the sacred and profane.

 

In a rural nation, which in Poland is under the domination of Christianity, the sacred sphere plays a greater role than the profane one. (“Catholic” Poland and “Orthodox” Greece are comparable in this respect).

 

Once the algorithm of collective behavior has been discovered it is possible to carry out the educational policy of the community. The main agent of the policy is, in the case of national character, first of all, what can be called the “emotional policy”. In the description of Polish national character Kazimierz Dąbrowski places the emotional components in the first place. Therefore, in Poland the “emotional policy” is more important than the “economical policy”.

 

THE POLISH EMOTIONAL POLICY TOWARD THEMSELVES AND OF OTHERS TOWARD POLES

 

Plato in his dialogues critically described those who used emotional arguments, marked by strongly positive or negative adjectives, in order to manipulate people’s (Greek demos) behavior. This is why they were called demagogues. According to Dąbrowski, emotions are the main agent and component of character. It follows that he who controls his emotions, controls individuals and groups, controls “national character”. K. Dąbrowski knew it well when writing:

 

1. The extreme Polish emotional reactions “are an object of the deliberate action of demagogical agents, which are aware of the trait of our character and follow a policy that is detrimental for our culture” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

2. “In our history and everyday life we had and still, incessantly, have to deal with the phenomenon of taking advantage of individual and group tensions in order to act in a direction that is unwanted by the individual, or group” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 107).

 

It is not clear why Dąbrowski, who had European (studies and internships) as well as American and Canadian experiences (internships and career) quite easily justified the irrational behaviors of Poles. He claimed that we, as a nation, “for ages” had to deal with the strong pressure of behaviors transmitted to Poles by the occupants.

 

The author doesn’t investigate why similar impulses were not transmitted from Poles to the occupants. Perhaps, even in his research, he wasn’t able to intellectually and emotionally detach himself from the “postcolonial syndrome”, which as a perspective for the interpretation of behaviors is present in the conception of Polish national character.

 

According to Dąbrowski, “In view of the disappointments, distressing experiences, untrue and feigned argumentation handed down from generation to generation, new experiences, which can have positive effects, bring about agglutinative associations” (Dąbrowski, 1992, pp. 107–108). It’s quite obvious that the emotional policy, although playing a vital role (together with the economic policy) in the creation of collective behaviors, irrationalizes them; the economic policy, meanwhile, to a greater extent rationalizes them.⁸

 

NOT EVERY THINKING MODE BECOMES NEGATIVE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF NEGATIVE EMOTIONS

 

As the intellectual-emotional associations can be considerably significant, they perhaps can’t change the very bases of thinking. Otherwise similar changes would be present in those who influenced the Polish mode of thinking, e.g. Russians, Austrians, and Prussians. Such changes have not been noticed. Why do the agglutinative associations affect Poles and do not affect the representatives of the other cultures who are active components of these associations, e.g. the permanent neighbors? Why do not such changes affect, e.g., Greeks, Jews, Gypsies, Turks, Armenians, Finns or Czechs, i.e. all other nations that were subject to a similar “emotional policy”? And sometimes even a crueler one.

 

When writing this text somebody asked me, as a Pole with 60 years experience of living among Poles, what are the two main characteristics of Poles that could distinguish them in a positive way. Considering the fragmentary observations of other nations of Europe, random meetings with the representatives of other nations, numerous studies, readings, programs concerning the culture of other peoples and nations of the world.

 

I would answer in the following way: (1) in respect to external body features: unconventional beauty, unconscious charm; (2) in respect to intellectual features: an impulsive talent to undertaking difficult enterprises with success, despite the lack of proper education as well as technical, economical and existential conditions. In the short run these features save us. Nevertheless, in the long run they bring us to ruin.

 

As Poles, we are used in various international projects, mainly as “decorative objects”. Due to our gigantic lack of organizational talent, which turns our brilliant ideas and excellent beginnings into spectacular failures, we are never allowed to direct research projects.

 

All the features mentioned by K. Dąbrowski in the positive features group:

 

(1) proclivity to idealize; (2) romanticism; (3) mysticism; (4) courage; (5) heroism; (6) mildness; (7) humanitarianism; (8) magnanimity; (9) the lack of cruelty; (10) truthfulness; (11) the “yes” for “yes”, “no “ for “no“ attitude; (12) loyalty; (13) fulfilling commitments; (14) hospitality; (15) obstinacy; (16) nervousness; (17) the sense of autonomy; (18) the sense of freedom; (19) individualism; (20) numerous talents (except the organizational ones) could easily be found in other nations. Moreover, many nations, to a greater or lesser extent, identify with them.

 

On the other hand, I do not know whether I could regard as positive such features as, e.g., demonstrative mysticism, romanticism, nervousness, or individualism. Certainly, they can be regarded as characterological imprints stemming from the procedure of dehumanization of Poles, rationalized and transformed into psychological “positives”. It seems that the positive features reveal themselves in contact with strangers, while in contact with “fellowmen” prevail the negative ones.

 

Thereby, Poles have two characters, one is “external” and the other is “internal”, one is defensive (rationalized and sacralized), the other is basic and concealed (suppressed and masked). The latter develops in homes without a bathroom; in villages without plumbing; in cities without even roads; in schools without access to the internet; in express trains which always come late; in regulations, which in totality are not known to anyone; and in the production of these regulations, as an obligation to reproduce the oppression of the “fellowmen”, in collective alcoholism and alcoholysis (an analogy to psychoanalysis), which are the main Polish “national ill”, and the main Polish “national remedy”, and so forth.

 

For the great majority of Poles is comely and talented, their appearance and talent count for little in Poland. Many talented people do not find employment and recognition. In order to support my opinion I will quote the last sentence from the K. Dąbrowski’s chapter on gifts: “And hence (…) the loss of many foremost talents in many fields of science and art in favor of the countries which were able to appreciate them and provide them with proper conditions for development” (Dąbrowski, 1992, p. 128).

 

The preceding fragment also concerned its author, whose theory, up to the present time maintained in the USA and Canada, is still not known nor studied in Poland. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology was able to afford a year course of the theory of creativity based on the Dabrowski’s theory, in Poland, by contrast, a somber silence. Fortunately, everyone can type in “Kazimierz Dąbrowski” or “positive disintegration” on the Internet and learn, from Americans or Canadians, about him and his theory.

 

SOME REMARKS ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT OF “HUMANITY”

 

Max Scheler, the founder of philosophical anthropology, presented in his research the problems of differences among people. He decided that in order to clearly define the differences it was necessary to find a principle that would relate them. Hence he recalled the Ernst Haeckel’s opinion that without such a principle it would be equally valid to treat, e.g. Veddas on Ceylon and Aku people in Africa as separate “authentic species”.

 

Scheler found a criterion of the unity of “homo naturalis” in the idea of “human rights” and “human reason” (e.g. in positivism), but he himself thought that there is no unity of a man to other people (and animals). Such unity can be found, according to his opinion, only through relating the man to God. The return to the “principle of the sacred” in defining the anthropological “principle of humanity” is rather traditional. There is one nation because there is one person governing the people, the dominant one, e.g., the king or the elected one, for example, the president. Races constitute one mankind because we think of God as of a caretaker and tutor of all people. Humanity as the “principle of the sacred” is slightly less hierarchically interpreted in the C. G. Jung’s conception (it becomes the archetypal principle).

 

Since the days of Arthur Schopenhauer, it has been assumed that the principle of humanity is based exclusively on the fact that a man can halt his apparatus of fight for the preservation of his individual life and the life of his species in favor of an instrument of culture, language, concepts, etc., and further, owing to the “cephalization” of the man. The concept of humanity on the ground of Dąbrowski’s theory would be quite similar.

 

Humanity is a process and a state of personality that realizes itself in developed democratic society and in every other political system that doesn’t comply with these standards, e.g. in feudal society, where the “principle of the sacred” was binding owing to the ideals imperatively present in culture.

 

HUMANITY AS THE ASPECT OF HUMAN SPIRIT AND DEMOCRACY

 

Reaching humanity (the humanization of the individual and nation) can be defined, after A. Toynbee, as a process of passing from tribal life to democracy. The Poles, as individuals and as a national community, had in the past and still have gigantic problems with democracy. The tribal reactions, their sacralization in the forms of collective behavior (during 44 years of the communist system, but a millennium of the church system) hampers the development of the liberal principle of humanity.

 

The typically “Polish” preference for “the principle of the sacred”, identified with the “principle of humanity”, have recently found its expression in the Halina Romanowska-Łakomy’s theory—(Droga do człowieczeństwa [The Path to Humanity]). The author, a professor at the Institute of Philosophy of the Warmia and Mazury University in Olsztyn, revives the line and spirit of the Polish philosophy based on the sacral ideas of Judaism and Christianity and expands it with certain Buddhist ideas. It is a work that combines the disciplines of philosophy, psychology and mystical pedagogy. And in respect to the form and content is similar to the Wincenty Lutosławski’s mystical theory (cf. Metafizyka [Metaphysics], 2005).

 

The approach presented by Halina Romanowska-Łakomy can be surprising in view of the fact that her father, Julian Romanowski (1898–1991), a logician and assistant of Kazimierz Twardowski, came from the analytic school, which was established and developed in the interwar period in Lviv (Lwow). Hence one could expect a democratic, or liberal theory of humanity rather than the actual revival and development of the mystical “principle of humanity”( the principle of the sacred).

 

The Halina Romanowska-Łakomy’s text is a demonstration of the still active in Polish philosophical works “spirit of the borderline”. In her publications it manifests itself in, e.g., the frequent use of expressions such as “inter”, or “trans”. In this concept humanity is an entity that can be interpreted as a “transhumanistic” dimension, as a conglomeration of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of human actions, submitted in that study to the mystical, one would say, ecological “principle of the sacred”.⁹

 

In order to counterbalance the religious (or ethical) “principle of the sacred”, which is prevailing in Poland, with the humanistic vision of the humanity, it is necessary to take into account the “democratic principle”, by combining them. It is possible that in order to change the Polish national character it is necessary to re-describe the relation between “the sacred” and “democracy”, as elements of personality and communities that since time immemorial have been in an overt or covert conflict.

 

An one-sidedly constructed theory of national character, which excludes the democratic principle of humanity, petrifies the collective “vices and virtues”, establishes them as fixed antinomies. It also submits them to the to the processes of unconscious “rationalization” and obsessive “re-sacralization”, which form a part of the defensive mechanisms of ego, also the defensive mechanisms of the individual and collective ego (of either communities or nations).

 

After all, the stress on “the sacred”, thus on the “woman principle” of humanity, demands its complementation by adding the “man principle” of creativity (Cf. W. Lutosławski, Metafizyka, 2005).

 

CONCLUSION

 

The Poles, as well as other nations subject to a long-lasting procedure of “dehumanization”, under occupation, during wars and battles, gradually yielded to the procedure and in the end it affected them to a great extent. They are sufferers of a syndrome that in psychology of history is known as the “post colonial syndrome”, hence their problem with freedom, prosperity and democracy, etc. The last national rebellions, which took place after World War Two, the events of Poznań 1956, Solidarność 1980, lasted only a short time and ended not only with failures, but also with partial success.

 

Cyclically repeated (due to the lack of democracy and liberty) “uprisings”, “rebellions”, “liberations” activated and still activate the procedures of “humanization” of Poles. Nevertheless the formally removed procedures of dehumanization have not released the dynamisms of humanization of Poles, which include economical conditions as well as collective and individual communication. Poles, as citizens of their own country, are still under oppressive regulations, slave customs, all the mental 50-year-long period of mourning, melancholy and revenge on themselves, or others. Another important aspect of today’s Poland is the predominance of defensive behaviors over the developmental ones, dehumanizing behaviors over the humanizing ones (the lack of property, social degradation, the lack of privatization, the lack of material and legal bases for intellectual activity, the disintegration of elites, extensive alcoholism, criminal behavior toward children etc.
The Dąbrowski’s conception of Polish national character together with the Romanowska-Łakomy’s conception could be used as a base for the modern European research in the intercultural differences conducted in Poland. A comparison of these differences could help to better interpret the significance of certain factors of Polish national character in the context of the modern understanding of the principle of humanity.

 

It could also facilitate the analysis of current psychological problems of the modernization of Poland inside new borders and of the Polish participation in international projects.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR — Ph.D., professor of philosophy at Fryderyk Chopin University of Music (Warsaw, Poland) and professor of psychology at Trnavska Univerzita (Bratislava, Slovakia).

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¹ H. Dujker, N. Frijda, National Character and National Stereotypes. A trend report prepared for the International Union Scientific Psychology, Amsterdam 1960, pp. 12–36.

 

² According to O. Spengler and A. J. Toynbee, the subject of history are cultures; according to K. Marx, the working class; according to Th. Carlyle, outstanding individuals; F. Meinecke, by contrast, claimed that history is a plurality of unrepeatable epochs and groups.

 

³ A brief review of the concept of man, according to the criteria of “human nature” (“humanity”) can be found in the Ewa Starzyńska-Kościuszko’s book, Wprowadzenie do filozofii. Filozoficzne koncepcje człowieka [Introduction to Philosophy. The philosophical Concepts of Man], Warszawa, 1999. The work mentions such criteria as: dignity (G. Pico della Mirandola); the thinking ghost (Descartes); bestiality (Th. Hobbes); antinomity, the centre between anything and everything (B. Pascal); the psychophysical parallelism (N. de Malebranche); the machine (J. Offray de La Mettrie), the social contract (J. J. Rousseau); reason and transcendence (I. Kant); nirvana (A. Schopenhauer); the “superman” (F. Nietzsche); the person (M. Scheler); eccentric positionality (H. Plessner); love and freedom (E. Fromm); existence for oneself and existence for another (J. P. Sartre); the person and individual (J. Maritain); the person and community (E. Mounier); the only and absolute criterion of evolution (P. Teilard de Chardin); and so forth.

 

⁴ The original text “On Polish National Character”, which was created by Kazimierz Dąbrowski, ca. 1957–1962, was first published by me during martial law, in 1981, in the quarterly “Zdrowie Psychiczne” (Mental Health), no. 2 and 3, in the commemorative issue dedicated to the author, after his death (on 26 November 1980 in the heart surgery clinic in Anin). Here I am referring to an abridged version, published 11 years later in the monthly “Regiony” (issue 19, 1992, no. 1, pp. 106–129).

 

⁵ According to Julian Ochorowicz, it is not individualism, but “individualishness” (osobnictwo), reluctance to joint activities (long lasting, organized and directed by one person). “Poles tolerate only short-lived relationships such as confederacies, reunions, abductions of women, sledge rides. There is no such solidarity among them in their day to day life, as, for example, among Jews” (E. Lewandowski, Narodowy charakter Polaków i innych [The National Character of the Poles and Others], Warsaw 2008, p. 177).

 

⁶ I have found a psychophisiological substantiation of this position in such a positive description of prelogical dynamisms in the Jan Mazurkiewicz’s conception: “In the life of a man, nations and mankind the prelogical dynamism plays a great part, not only as a transitional period, leading to the evolution of the dynamisms of logical thinking, but in the highest point of the psychical development as a factor cooperating with the dynamism of logical thinking, providing it with the lively, great power of the exclusive emotional approaches as well as with the freedom and flexibility of thought association, which in extreme cases of prelogical thinking consists on associating “everything with everything” without taking into account the laws of nature and logical thinking. But in a proper synergy with the dynamism of logical thinking the prelogical thinking facilitates the logical thinking to go beyond a stereotyped formula, enables real creativity”. J. Mazurkiewicz, Wstęp do psychofizjologii normalnej. Ewolucja aktywności korowo psychicznej [An Introduction to Normal Psychophysiology. [The evolution of cortical-psychological activity], vol. 1, Warszawa 1950, p. 98. This mechanism could perhaps be responsible for the “numerous talents” of Poles indicated by Dąbrowski and noticed by others.

 

⁷ The fact was observed by Julian Kaliszewski, here quoted by Julian Ochorowicz: “The Poles are a thoroughly aristocratic nation, but in the worst sense of the word (…). Here, among Poles, everyone despises everyone else, if only the latter is lower on the social ladder. A nobleman despises a burgess, a burgess despises a farmer, he despises a farmhand, a farmhand despises a cowherd, a cowherd despises a Jew.” etc. “Polish equality is a fiction”, “Let us get it off our chest. Isn’t it so? And, by comparing it to American or French equality, let us consider how far we are from real equality.” (J. Ochorowicz, O polskim charakterze… “[On Polish Character], p. 65). Today, the state of affairs is slightly improved, but still it is only “slightly”.

 

⁸ The confirmation of the Dąbrowski’s observations, concerning the great role of emotional policy toward Poles and among them, were the first comments in the discussion on this text during the international conference entitled “Human being and humanity” (24th June 2008, the University of Warmia and Mazury, Olsztyn, Poland). A young woman who introduced herself as Russian claimed that it is risky to use the term “Polish national character” etc. Another discussant by “asking a question” suggested that one of the elements of “Polish national character” is anti- Semitism. When I was reading the text, a middle-aged man in the first row continually, after every second line, burst out laughing. Such an emotional triangle emerges during the situations of emotional-intellectual stress. When the censorship is lifted from the problems and concepts recognized as taboos, a wave of emotional explosions arises.

 

⁹ Halina Romanowska-Łakomy discusses the following problems: the existential problems of psyche; the philosophical personal structure as a source of reflexive existence; the existential sense of own guilt; the existential nature of man; the ethical source of existential questions; the pain of the search for the “sense” as an expression of philosophical structure; the modern man confronted with his philosophical structure, the defense against reflexivity; the escape from reality; the personal metamorphosis; the internal model of awareness; the ethical model; the ethical transformation; the path from particularistic to holistic and universal awareness; the awareness beyond anxiety and defensiveness; the awaken awareness; the awareness of real humanity; the sacred awareness, its mystic and real role; the knowledge of self-awareness; the axiological responsibility; the ethical will and the hidden resources of humanity.

 

Źródło: Dialogue and Universalism No. 6-7/2009
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